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REPRESENTING KNOWLEDGE 
WITH THEORIES ABOUT THEORIES 
EDWARD P. STABLER, JR. 
D Theories about proofs in other theories can be used not only to provide 
representations of completed proofs, but also to provide an elegant, 
declarative, and logically pure method for controlling deductions. This 
idea is used implicitly in a widening range of applications, and deserves 
explicit consideration. In this paper, a technique for generating a standard 
proof-representation-building metatheory for Horn-clause theories de- 
fined, its logical semantics is carefully considered, and the sense in which 
the technique is correct and complete is defined. Then we show how such 
metatheories can elegantly represent a wide range of problems. We focus 
on some problems which are naturally formulated in terms of overly 
general axioms together with conditions on proofs which block exactly the 
derivations of incorrect results: diagnosis, planning, and natural-language 
parsing. This surprising approach can yield representations that are suc- 
cinct, feasible, and close to the most intuitive, informal statement of the 
problem. Methods for using such an approach efficiently with left-to-right 
theorem provers are described. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Theories about sentences or 
theories of knowledge, belief, 
proofs in another theory are often useful. Some 
and action, for example, use representations of the 
sentences believed by an agent [20]. In the most straightforward logical approaches 
to parsing, the output is a proof tree [24]. In other applications, a proof tree is 
taken as input to further processing. For example, a representation of a proof is 
Address correspondence to Dr. E. P. Stabler, Department of Linguistics, University of California, Los 
Angeles, California 90024-1543. 
Received August 1987; accepted October 1988. 
THE JOURNAL OF LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
OElsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc., 1990 
655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010 0743-1066/90/$3.50 
106 EDWARD P. STABLER, JR. 
sometimes displayed as a justification of proven results, or it is used by programs 
that aid in detecting errors in the axioms of the object theory [31]. The focus of this 
paper, though, will be on applications that use restrictive conditions on proofs: 
conditions that are not satisfied by any proof of certain provable entailments of the 
object theory, These conditions, we will say, “sacrifice the completeness” of the 
proof method of the object theory. Our approach to defining conditions on proofs 
differs from many others in that these conditions are defined in first-order logic as 
relations over provably correct representations of first-order resolution proofs. The 
advantages of using a declarative, first-order logical representation, with its well- 
understood semantics and proof techniques, can thus be carried over to the 
metatheoretic level. 
The most common application of conditions on proof trees is in controlling the 
search for a refutation by pruning the derivation tree being searched. This 
technique is to be distinguished from other “metalevel” strategies that only control 
the order in which the tree is searched. Some of the former, pruning techniques 
are well known. For example, some proofs can be eliminated from a resolution 
search space without affecting the completeness of the proof procedure. One of 
the best-known strategies of this sort is the elimination of “repetitive” derivations, 
i.e., derivations in which a clause identical to one of its ancestors is derived by 
input resolution [17, 29, 61. 
In other systems, the search for a proof is controlled in ways that may sacrifice 
completeness, although that is not their goal. For example, heuristic techniques, 
the imposition of bounds on the depth or breadth of a proof, and interactive 
theorem provers may restrict the search for a proof in ways that sacrifice complete- 
ness, but their goal is just to avoid unnecessary search. There is a third class of 
applications for restrictions on proofs, though, which are naturally expressed in 
terms of axioms together with conditions on the proofs that deliberately sacrifice 
completeness. In these cases, the set of refutations from the axioms is a superset of 
the set of desired, “correct” refutations. Strictly speaking, under the usual inter- 
pretation, the axioms are overly general, but the incorrect entailments are never 
proven because conditions on the proofs block the proof of exactly those results. 
Another way to look at the matter is to view the basic axioms as correct 
characterizations of the set of possible solutions, where the correct solutions are 
then characterized as possible solutions whose proofs in the original theory have 
special properties. A simple logical foundation and applications of this approach 
will be the focus of this paper. 
This basic idea was pioneered by Chomsky [8] in his use of multiple levels of 
representation in the description of natural languages: a basic theory (a generative 
grammar) characterizes a class of strings, and then a second level of principles 
applies to the proofs that those strings follow from the basic theory (i.e. to 
derivations from the “base” grammar). This sort of strategy is still discernible in 
the most recent efforts in Chomskian syntax. A similar problem representation 
seems to be valuable in other domains as well.’ The application of a metatheoretic 
‘Although it was parsing techniques inspired by Chomskian syntax that inspired this work, the 
connection between the problem representations described here and Chomsky’s theories of language is 
rather loose. Chomsky defined transformations on the “base” trees and principles that must be satisfied 
by the outputs of these transformations. The well-formedness conditions on the outputs of the 
transformations, then, only indirectly restrict the set of “base” trees that can correspond to good 
sentences. 
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representational strategy to parsing with Chomskian concepts is only one of the 
natural applications of metatheoretic strategies. 
We focus on Horn-clause problems because they allow such simple proof 
techniques and fast implementations. The extension of the approach to full 
first-order logic, though, is straightforward. In this paper, we consider some 
problems that are naturally expressed in terms of Horn-clause axioms together 
with constraints on proofs, and then we elaborate our metatheoretic approach to 
obtain correct representations that are more feasibly managed by left-to-right 
Horn-clause refutation systems like PROLOG, SLD resolution with a leftmost 
selection rule [16], or Earley deduction. ’ Finally, we will contrast our approach 
with related work and consider directions for further research. 
2. LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
To constrain derivations we must first have terms to represent them. There are 
standard techniques for defining proof trees of a theory. We will begin with one of 
the simplest techniques. We transform a theory S into a theory Tag that specifies 
derivation trees in S. 
In the presentation of his incompleteness theorem, Giidel formalized deriva- 
tions by assigning natural numbers to the primitive symbols, thus representing 
formulas by finite sequences of natural numbers and proofs by finite sequences of 
finite sequences of natural numbers [12]. It is illuminating to note some of the 
respects in which the present approach differs from Giidel’s. In the first place, we 
wiil not use a system in which a proof or any other expression can contain a term 
that, under the intended interpretation, refers to an expression properly containing 
it. Thus no predication can assert anything about itself. Under our intended 
interpretation, terms of TJS) have exactly the same length and the same structure 
as the terms of S that they refer to: the interpretation of these terms is given by a 
symbol for symbol bijection. This makes the semantics and the proofs in the 
metatheoty rJSI extremely simple. But it is clear that this same property makes 
self-referential formulas impossible in a standard logic, for notice that we immedi- 
ately have the consequence that no finite expression can properly contain a name 
of itself. A second difference between our approach and standard Giidel number- 
ing in arithmetic is that we do not need to define a representation of proofs in S in 
the language of S itself; rather, it is convenient to allow the language of T”(S) to 
be a simple transformation of the language of S. These differences allow us to use 
an approach that is more concise and more efficient than the one Giidel needed. 
One final difference of less importance is that we represent proofs with trees 
rather than with sequences: trees provide useful information about the structure of 
the proof. 
We will first define a syntactic transformation ra that maps a theory S into a 
different theory TJSI, which specifies the proof trees of S. We then specify the 
intended semantic interpretation of the output of this transformation, the range of 
T”. And finally we establish some of the important properties of To. 
‘Earley deduction, an “all paths at once” resolution strategy inspired by Earley’s context-free 
parsing algorithm, is described in [25]. 
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2.1. The Syntactic Transfomzation 
We begin by motivating our approach with a simple example. The function TV 
transforms a logical theory expressed in Horn clauses into another theory which 
defines derivations in the original theory. The basic idea of the transformation is 
really quite simple and well known: the proof is represented by a variable added as 
a new argument o every predicate in the body of a clause, and by a term added as 
argument to every predicate in the head of a clause, as illustrated in the following 
example: 3 
s= { +mun(x), 
man(x) +male(x),humun(x), 
male(x) + ) 
human(x) + )) 
T(S) = { +man(x,Proof), 
man(x, ~4X>/[Q, RI) +mule(x,Q),human(x,R), 
male(x,male(x)) + , 
humun( x, human(x)) +- ] . 
Notice that one instance of + mun(x, Proof) that is inconsistent with the other 
clauses in T&S) is one in which x remains uninstantiated and Proof is instantiated 
to the term mun(x)/[mule(x>,humun(x)]. Letting the slash represent the domi- 
nance relation and putting the subtrees under a node in a list, this term represents 
the tree with a root labeled man(x) dominating two leaves labeled mule(x) and 
human(x), respectively, as shown in Figure 1. We interpret this as a proof tree 
indicating that, in S, Vmun(x) can be proven by proving Vmulek) and Vhumun(x), 
which in turn can be proven directly from unit clauses. We now explain these 
matters in detail, beginning with the syntax. 
Consider our previous example. Notice that language of r,,(S) is not the same as 
the language of S: it includes new predicates, and a number of new function 
symbols: the unary function symbols mun, mule, and human, the binary (infix) 
function /, and the list functions (which are, in canonical form, . and [I). We will 
define the language L’ of r,JS) in terms of L as follows. 
Let L be the language of an arbitrary theory S. Define a bijection name from 
the n-ary (n 2 0) predicate symbols of L onto a set of n-ary function symbols that 
do not occur in L. Then the the set of function symbols of L’ is the union of the 
3We follow the terminology and notation of [16], except that we will use not only ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’, . as 
names of variables, but any symbol beginning with an uppercase letter or underscore, as is done in 
many PROLOGs. 
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man(x) 
male(x) human(x) FIGURE 1. A simple proof tree. 
function symbols of L with the set F of new n-ary function symbols, 
F = {f”lf” = name( P”) for some predicate P” in L}, 
together with a set T containing three new function symbols (whose arity we have 
indicated with superscripts): 
T= {.‘,[I”>/‘}. 
The first two symbols in T are the standard binary “list constructor” and the 0-ary 
“empty list;” if these functors already occur in S, different symbols can be used to 
avoid ambiguity. To simplify the presentation, we assume that the symbols in T do 
not occur in L or F. And we assume that L does not use any symbol as an n-ary 
function symbol and as an n-ary predicate symbol, so name can be a syntactic 
identity function. As is standard, we adopt the notational convention of using the 
more readable bracket notation for lists (e.g., [a,[b]]) as an abbreviation for the 
canonical functional notation (.(a, .(.(b, [ I), [ I>) or infix notation a.((b.[ ]>.[ 1)). 
The set of predicate symbols of L’ is the sei (again using superscripts to indicate 
arity) 
(P”“1 P” a predicate in L}. 
Definition of rO. 
6) For any set S of Horn clauses, 7&S) = (7&C)IC E S}. 
(ii) For any Horn clause C such that for some k > 0 
c= *AI,...,&, 
we define 
70(C) = CA\,...,Ab, 
where if the predicate of Ai is an n-ary predicate P (n 2 O), then A; is the 
K+ I-ary predicate P with the n arguments of A, as its fist arguments and 
with a new variable as its last argument. 
(iii) For any Horn clause C such that 
C=A,+, 
we define 
70(C) =/lb + ) 
where the predicate of A, is an n-ary predicate P (n 2 O), and the 
predicate of A6 is the n + 1-ary predicate P with the n arguments of A, 
as its first arguments and with (the function expression that is syntactically 
identical to) A, itself as its last argument. 
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(iv) For any Horn clause C such that for some k > 0 
C=Ao+A,,...,Ak, 
we define 
where 
(a) if the predicate of Ai (k 2 i 2 1) is an n-ary predicate P (n L 01, then 
A; is the n + 1-ary predicate P with the n arguments of Ai as its first 
arguments and with a new variable as its last argument, and 
(b) if the predicate of A, is an n-ary predicate P (n 2 O), then Ah is the 
12 + 1-ary predicate P with the n arguments of A, as its first arguments 
and with A,/[ VI,. . . , Vkl as its last argument, where V,, . . . , V, are the 
k new variables introduced by step (a). 
Notice that according to this definition, TV is not really functional, since the 
choice of “new variables” is not determined by the source clause. However, it is 
clear that all the values of TJC) for any C are variants of one another: since we 
are interested in the entailments of the values of r&0, any one of these values 
will suffice. 
One other point that should be noted is that T,, introduces some redundancy: 
the representation of the proof repeats information that is specified in other 
arguments of the predicates. Obviously, we could eliminate some of this redun- 
dancy in various ways. The reason for keeping the redundancy in ~a is, intuitively, 
just that it keeps the “tree-building” part of the theory separate from the 
arguments needed to define the entailments. As a result, this formulation is slightly 
more convenient in the proof of the “noninterference” property of TV, defined 
below. This formulation also facilitates the consideration of sound ways of building 
something less, or something rather different, than complete proof trees, as 
discussed in the section below on efficient representations. 
2.2. An Appropriate Semantic Interpretation of the Transformed Theory 
As noted above, transformations like TV are really very common in logic program- 
ming, but they are often introduced as proof-theoretic tricks, with little semantic 
explanation. The basic idea we will use has been well explained, though, as in the 
following passage by Moore: 
Typically this sort of thing is done using string operations like concatenation, so that the 
conjunction of P and Q would be represented by something like ‘(‘/PI‘ A ‘IQl‘Y. . . . There is 
a much more elegant way to do the encoding, however, which is due to McCarthy (1962) 
[19]. For purposes of semantic interpretation of the object language, which is what we want 
to do, the details of the syntax are largely irrelevant. In particular, the only thing that we 
need to know about the syntax of conjunctions is that there is some way of taking P and Q 
and producing the conjunction of P and Q. We can represent this by having a function And 
such that And(P, Q> denotes the conjunction of P and Q. To use McCarthy’s term, 
And(P,Q) is an abstract syntax for representing the conjunction of P and Q. We will 
represent all the logical operators of the object language by functions in an abstract syntax. 
DO, p. 791 
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The basic strategy here really dates back at least to Tarski (1934) 1351, who used 
exactly this approach in his work on truth definitions. As we noted above, Godel’s 
(1931) formal representation in PM of syntactic expressions of PM was necessarily 
more complex, but embodies the same sort of idea. The same approach is used in 
most modern presentations of formal logic. Applying this idea to our problem, we 
take rO(S) to be a theory about the formal properties of S. Instead of representing 
such things as conjunctions of propositional-calculus atoms, we will represent 
proof trees of (universally closed) predicate-calculus atoms. This raises some minor 
technical difficulties, to which we now turn. 
We have particular interest in the proof trees corresponding to refutations in S. 
An ordered tree is standardly specified by a pair (A, R) where A is a set of 
vertices and R is a set of sequences of edges (where the edges are ordered pairs of 
vertices). A labeling then associates a label with each vertex in the tree. We will 
use a slightly different specification of a labeled tree. A labeled tree will be 
specified with either a label by itself or a term of the form L/S where L is a label 
and S is the sequence [t,, . . . , t,] of trees immediately dominated by L. So a label 
is a tree consisting of just a root node with no arcs. In a tree E/[t,, . . . , t,], I is the 
label of the root vertex, r,, . . . , t, (n 2 0) are trees, and an arc connects the root 
labeled 1 to the root of each ti (0 < i I n), in order. 
Definition. The set of proof trees over L is the set of trees with nodes labeled with 
atoms of L. We will regard these atoms as implicitly universally closed. 
Definition. Let G be a goal +-A where A is an atom. Let q be an SLD refutation 
(G,, G,, . . . , G,,) (G, = G, G, = 01 using input clauses C,, . . . , C, with unifiers 
8 i, . . . , On, whose composition we will call 8. Then a proof tree corresponding to 
Y is a proof tree such that in 9, Gi_ i (0 < i I n> is resolved with the head of 
input clause C, = C + C,,, . . . , Cim (m 2 0) iff there is a node in the tree labeled 
C0 with m daughters labeled C,,B,. . . , Ci_8. Again, we regard the literals that 
label the tree as universally closed. 
This is a standard notion of a proof tree (e.g., [32]). It is easy to show that for 
any SLD refutation V of a theory, there is exactly one proof tree corresponding to 
q. Given any particular proof tree F and a computation rule R, there is a theory 
with at least one SLD refutation via R that corresponds to F. 
We can now define an interpretation I’ with domain D’ in terms of our original 
theory S, its language L, and its interpretation I. The only tricky part is clause c3>, 
because we need to have variables of the object language L in the domain D’ of 
our theory. We regard these variables, which range over D, as universally quanti- 
tied: 
(1) 
(2) 
The domain. D’ is the well-formed expressions of L together with the 
proof trees over L and sequences of proof trees over L. 
The interpretation of the function symbols. All function symbols except those 
in 
T= {.“,[I”,/‘} 
receive the Herbrand interpretation. That is, 0-ary functions are mapped 
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into themselves, and each n-ary (n > 0) function f is associated with the 
mapping from t,, . . . , t, to the function expression f(tr, . . . , t,). The function 
symbols in T provide representations of (labeled, ordered) trees with more 
than 0 arcs, as mentioned above. I’ associates / with the mapping from l/s 
to the tree with a root labeled 1 immediately dominating the subtrees in the 
sequence s. (We let Z/s denote the empty sequence whenever s is not itself 
a sequence.) I’ associates . and [] with the standard mappings to sequences: 
i 
(h,t 
I’(h.t) = (>> 
I,...,L) iftisasequence(t,,...,t,)(n20), 
otherwise, 
NI) = 0. 
(3) The interpretation of the predicate symbols. Following standard practice, 
expressions 4 of L containing free variables are interpreted relative to an 
assignment 5 of variables of L to elements of D: Z(4), is then defined for 
all expressions in L. We accordingly define I’ in terms of Z and assignments 
5. Every n-ary predicate symbol p” is assigned a set of n-tuples in D’ as 
follows: 
(a,,..., a,> EZ’( P”> 
iff 
for every 5, (Z(ai)*,..., Z(a,-i>*) +P”-‘), 
and a, is a proof tree corresponding to a refutation of +p(a,, . . . , a,,_ 1) 
in S. 
2.3. Motivating the Interpretation I’ 
At this point it would be nice to prove that Z E S iff I’ k TJS), but unfortunately, 
this does not hold. Consider the previous example of Section 2.1. It is clear that 
I’ l# humanC[ I, human([ I>) +- , and so I’ # human(x, human(x)) + , and yet this is a 
clause in 7JS). In short, under our intended interpretation, our transformed 
theories are false. 
We could consider looking for a different interpretation I” with the property 
that Z I= S iff Z” k ~~(9, but this is obviousIy not very appealing. We do not want 
an interpretation that verifies human([ 1, human([ 1)) +- . The most straightforward 
interpretations I” with the property Z b S iff I” b rO(S) are just not natural. 
A more appealing strategy is to define a different transformation 7 with the 
property that Z + S iff Z’ b 49. The noted problem with I’ arises because the 
domain we quanti’fy over includes not only the terms of L but also the predications 
of L and proofs in S that contain such predications. Suppose we formally define a 
new unary predicate term, so that it is satisfied by all and only terms of L. Then 
we could easily define a natural +r(S) that includes the axioms of this definition and 
adds a condition to every definite clause in the range of r,, requirmg that the terms 
in all but the last arguments of the predicates of that clause ,be terms of L. Then 
we would have Z b S iff I’ b r(S). However, these transformed theories r(S) are 
more complex than 7&Q. Not only does r(S) have more symbols than r,_,(S), but 
many proofs in ~6.9 would be considerably more complex. Notice that fenn, will 
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have the infinitely many terms of L in its extension: a proper axiomatization would 
need to make available names for the infinitely many variables of L, and the 
names of the function expressions will also be infinite if L contains even a single 
function symbol with positive arity. Consequently, finding a desired instance of a 
proof using elements of the extension of term, can be computationally trouble- 
some. 
Given the complexity of r(S), it is interesting to note the surprising fact that the 
property that I’ # rO(S) does not really matter for our practical purposes. In the 
first place, it is common for logic programmers to neglect conditions that will 
properly restrict the provable instances of a goal. Consider for example the 
standard definition of the append relation: 
When these clauses are added to any theory whose intended domain includes 
anything other than lists, the first clause is false under the standard interpretation 
of append. These consequences could be ruled out by adding a condition requiring 
that the arguments of append all be lists, but for most purposes this is unnecessary. 
The same is true for the result of applying ra. We should just keep in mind that 
T,$S> is only an approximation to the correct theory: we must be careful to 
properly restrict the instances of provable goals. The danger is just that when a 
logic program contains many such approximations, the programmer may forget the 
limitations of his axiomatization and get unsound results. 
For this reason, it worth noting that we can prove that ~a will behave properly 
on the range of practical cases that we are interested in. Notice that the problem- 
atic case human([ I, human([ ]>I +- is not in the range of ra, since human([ I> is not 
an expression in the language L of S-it contains the constant [I, which is in L’ 
but not in L. If we restrict our attention to refutations of goals that are in the 
range of me, we will never get an unsound result. So given a theory S and goal G, 
we do have a sound and efficient method for getting representations of proofs of G 
in S. The relevant results are the following (the proofs are in Appendix 1): 
Proposition 1 (Noninterference). There is an n-step SLD refutation of S U {GJ using 
input clauses C,, . . , , C,, and correct answer substitution E iff for some substitu- 
tion 77 for variables that do not occur in G, there is an n-step SLDa refutation of 
TJS) U {-ro(G)} using clauses 7JC,), . . . , TV with correct answer substitu- 
tion 7. 
Corollary 1 (Noninterference). S k VC iff, for some substitution q for variables that 
do not occur in C, T,@) k VT~(C)Q. 
Proposition 2 (Representation correctness). Let G = +-A, where A is atomic. There is 
an n-step SLD refutation of T,,(S) U (T,&G)} with a computed answer substitution 77 
@ 77 is a substitution {Proof/Tree) such that Proof is the variable introduced into 
r,JG) by T,,, and Tree is a derivation tree corresponding to an SLD refutation of 
(G) u S. 
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Corollary 2 (Representation correctness). Let G = + A, where A is atomic, and let 
rO(G) = + A’. Then rO(S) k VA’77 iff q, when restricted to variables in A’, is a 
substitution (Proof/Tree) such that Proof is the variable introduced into A’ by rO, 
and Tree is a derivation tree corresponding to a refutation of {G) U S. 
We conclude this section by considering again the example with which this 
section began to see that the interpretation we have provided is indeed very close 
to what was promised. When we prove that 
+ man( x, man( x)/[ maZe(x),human(x)]) 
is -inconsistent with ra(S), we can conclude that 
Vman(x,man(x)/[male(x),human(x)]) 
is entailed by the theory. Keeping in mind that the values of the variable in this 
term should really be restricted to the terms of the language of S, we have the 
result that when x is assigned any term in the language of S, 
man(x)/[male(x), human(x)] is a proof in S. In particular, then, if x1_, y,, . . . 
are variables of the object theory, we can conclude that man(x,)/ 
[male(x,), human( is a proof in S. That is, Vman(x,>) can be proven in the 
object theory by proving VmaZe(x,) and Vhuman(x,), which in turn can be proven 
directly from unit clauses. This is the interpretation we wanted. 
2.4. A Horn-Clause Provability Predicate 
A simple extension of our metatheoretic framework will suffice to define a basic 
“metainterpreter”, or object-language provability predicate, for definite-clause 
theories. Such predicates are used quite frequently [32, 41, and we will want to 
make use of one when we consider more efficient representations of our problems, 
below. 
We will use the same metatheoretic strategy to define a provability predicate 
that was used to define proof trees labeled with literals of the object theory. In this 
case, to represent theories we use sequences whose elements are clauses of the 
object theory. Introducing the comma as a binary infix functor and the left arrow as 
a unary postfix and binary infix function symbol, we can represent a sequence of 
ground clauses, as in 
[ ( man ( Socrates) t male( Socrates), human( Socrates)), 
(male( Socrates) + ) , 
( human ( Socrates) + ) ] . 
Representing a clause with variables is not possible in our system, since we have 
not provided names for any of the variables. It is not difficult to introduce variable 
names and explicit quantifiers as in [20], but avoiding names of object-language 
variables allows us to use simpler metatheories that also have real practical 
advantages: We can avoid computationally expensive substitute and unify predi- 
cates for object-language expressions. Consequently, rather than representing an 
object-theory clause with variables, we will use metatheoretic quantification to 
make claims about all of the instances of certain expressions. So, for example, a 
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nonground term like the following, occurring in a metatheoretic clause, will have 
its metatheoretic variables bound in the usual way, and these variables can range 
over a domain that includes all of the terms-including the variables-of the 
object theory: 
[(man(x) +mafe(x),human(x)), 
(male( socrates) +),(humun(socrutes) +)I. 
It is clear that this can properly capture the significance of the object theory’s 
variables.4 
With this representation of definite-clause theories, we can use the following 
elegant axiomatization of provability: 
demo(Theory,(P,Q)) +demo(Theoly,P),demo(Theory,Q) 
demo ( Theory, P ) +member((P+),Theoly) 
demo ( Theory , P) +member((P+Q),Theoly),demo(Theory,Q) 
These axioms say, roughly, that a conjunction is provable (or demonstrable) from 
the theory represented by the first argument if both conjuncts are; a literal P is 
provable if P + is an instance of a unit clause in the theory; and P is also 
provable if there is a clause in the theory of the form PO + Q, where there is a 
substitution 19 such that PO8 = PO and Q,O is provable. 
Notice that the axioms defining demo have the same flaw as the output of TV 
and the standard axiomatization of append. Strictly speaking, we should require 
that variables occurring in terms like 
[(man(x) +mule(x),humun(x)), 
(mule( Socrates) + ) , ( humun( Socrates) + )] 
range only over object-theory terms. However, we will never be testing any other 
instances, and so the simple formulation will do for practical purposes. A strictly 
correct formulation would simply be one in which we add to each of the three 
axioms the condition that (every instance of) Theory is a sequence of object-theory 
clauses, that Q is a conjunction of one or more positive object theory literals, and 
that P is a positive object-theory literal. 
3. APPLICATIONS 
As noted above, there are many applications for theories that produce representa- 
tions of completed proofs: parsing, justification facilities, and debuggers. We focus 
on applications with restrictive conditions over the proof representations: condi- 
tions that do not preserve the completeness of the proof procedure. We focus in 
particular on problems that are naturally formulated in terms of overly general 
axioms together with conditions on proofs which block exactly the derivations of 
4Nothing very important turns on this decision to avoid variable names. We choose this strategy 
simply for reasons of expository convenience and efficiency. Note that this strategy does not allow us to 
treat nonground theories as “first-class objects”, and it does not allow us to provide a logical 
foundations for PROLOG’s assert and retract predicates with variables, as pointed out in [S]. 
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incorrect results. To illustrate the range and power of this approach, we will briefly 
consider three rather different types of problems that are naturally expressed in 
this way. We consider basic formulations of these problems before considering 
more efficient representations in later sections. 
3.1. Diagnosis 
One recent approach to diagnosis involves finding an inconsistency between the 
observed behavior of a system and the behavior that follows from a logical 
specification of its design. Once such an inconsistency is detected, Reiter 1271 has 
shown how we can diagnose the problem by examining the proofs of inconsistency. 
A diagnosis is a minimal set of assumptions whose removal restores consistency. 
The procedure Reiter defines for computing diagnoses makes use of a relation tp 
that can be regarded as a constraint on proofs in a basic theory of the operation of 
the system being diagnosed. The relation tp is satisfied by inconsistency proofs that 
do not use certain axioms of the specification of the design and behavior of the 
system. In this sense, the object-level axioms are overly general in that they define 
a set of inconsistency proofs, only some of which-those satisfying particular 
instances of predications involving tp-are of interest. Let’s consider this in a little 
more detail. 
Since Reiter does not present a Horn-clause formulation, we will adapt one of 
his examples and show one way of defining his function tp as a metatheoretical 
relation. Consider the circuit shown in Figure 2. The operation of the basic logic 
gates is easily axiomatized. For each type of gate that might have a fault, we can 
introduce explicitly a check on the assumption that the gate is operating normally, 
by conditioning our axioms about the gates as illustrated below: 
output( Gate, 0) + and_gate( Gate), inputl( Gate, 0)) not_abnormal( Gate) 
output ( Gate, 0) + and_gate( Gate), input2( Gate, 0)) not_abnomal( Gate) 
output( Gate, 1) +- and_gate( Gate), inputl( Gate, 1)) input2( Gate, 1)) 
not_abnomal( Gate) 
output ( Gate, 1) +- or_gate( Gate), input 1( Gate, 1)) not_abnomal( Gate) 
output ( Gate, 1) + or_gute( Gate), input2( Gate, 1), not_abnormal(Gate) 
output ( Gate, 0) + or_gate( Gate), input 1( Gate, 0)) input 2( Gate, 0) , 
not_abnomal( Gate) 
out‘t( Gate, Out) t 
xor_gute ( Gate), 
inputl( Gate, Znl), input2( Gate, Zn2), xor( Znl, Zn2, Out), 
rwt_abnomal(Gate) 
xor( 1, 1,0) +- xor(l,O, 1) 4- xor(O,l, 1) + xor(O,O, 0) + 
disjoint(0, 1) 6 disjoint ( 1,O) + 
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FIGURE 2. A full adder. 
To specify the design of the particular circuit we must specify 
circuit: 
and_gure( al) + and-gate ( a 2) + xor_gafe ( xl) + 
xor_gate ( x 2) +- or_gufe( 01) + 
the gates of the 
We add our assumptions that these gates are operating normally: 
not_abnoR?zaf( al) + not_abnormal( a2) + not_abnomd( xl) +- 
not_abnomal( x 2) +- not_abnomal( 01) + 
And finally we must specify how the gates are connected in such a way that every 
needed value can be determined from the specified inputs to the circuit. For this 
purpose the following conditionals suffice (although the corresponding bicondition- 
als would of course be true): 
inputl( x2, Value) + output (xl, V&e) 
input2( x2, Vdue) + inputl( a2, V&e) 
input 2( a2, Value) +- output( xl, Value) 
inputl( al, Value) + inputl( xl, Value) 
input 2( al, Vulue) * input2( xl, V&e) 
inputl( 01, Value) + output (a 2, Value) 
input 2( 01, V&e) +- output (al, Ifdue) 
Observed behavior then can be represented with axioms like the following: 
inputl( xl, 1) + input2( x1,0) + inputl( a2,l) + 
output( x2,1) + output(ol,0) + 
This is a complete, basic theory of the operation of our faulty circuit. 
Given a theory like this, we want to check for an inconsistency between the 
observed output and the output that the design specification determines. This can 
be done by adding the Horn-clause expression of the fact that no output gate can 
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have two values X, Y that are disjoint-a “goal”: 
+- output( Gate, X), disjoint( X,Y), output( Gate, Y) 
If we can refute this negative clause (showing the inconsistency of the theory 
comprising this clause together with the other axioms), then we know the circuit is 
faulty. For convenience, we will use the equivalent strategy of adding the following 
clauses and proving the inconsistency of the result: 
inconsistency + output( Gate, X), disjoint( X, Y), output( Gate, Y) 
+ inconsistency 
This alternative strategy, using a negative unit clause, will allow our metatheoretic 
transformation to give us a single proof tree to inspect-a proof tree with 
inconsistency at the root. 
Since the questionable assumptions of the theory have been marked as assump- 
tions that the components are not_abnormal, Reiter defines a diagnosis to be a 
minimal set C of components such that removing not_abnonnal(Component) for 
every Component in C restores consistency. In this example, there are three 
diagnoses: [xl], [x2, a21, [x2,011. These diagnoses can be determined by examin- 
ing the proofs of inconsistency to see which not_abnormal assumptions about the 
circuit were used. This is exactly what r0 allows us to do. Applying TV to the 
axioms presented above, we produce a new l-place predicate again named incon- 
sistency with the property that the provable instances of inconsistency(Proof) are 
exactly those in which Proof is instantiated to a proof of inconsistency in the 
original theory. This transformed theory can then be embedded in a larger 
metatheory which defines special properties that we want these proofs to have. 
Since the questionable assumptions of the theory have been marked as assump- 
tions that the components are not_abnonnal, we can examine our proofs to find 
which components’ operations were assumed to be normal. We simply check the 
proof tree for nodes labeled not_abnormal(Component). The set of components 
named in these nodes in a particular proof is what Reiter calls a conflict set. One 
way to compute the diagnoses involves finding every conflict set by finding every 
proof of inconsistency, and then computing the possible diagnoses from the set of 
conflict sets. Clearly this approach is not feasible if there is a very large or infinite 
set of inconsistency proofs, or if the proofs are very complex. 
Reiter defines a much more efficient way of computing a diagnosis, though, 
which does not, in general, require finding all proofs of inconsistency. This 
procedure uses a procedure tp which searches for inconsistency proofs in which 
various not_abnormal assumptions are not used, and returns a conflict set of a 
proof if one is found. Roughly, the idea is to find one conflict set and then 
efficiently pare it down to a minimal conflict set by calling tp to see if there are 
inconsistency proofs using only some proper subsets of the conflict sets already 
found. (See Reiter [271 for the details of this “paring-down” algorithm.) Notice 
that tp is exactly the sort of relation that is easily represented with our metatheo- 
retie approach. We can define tp as a two-place relation between a list of 
components and a conflict set for a proof, where the proof is one that does not use 
assumptions about the components listed in the first argument.5 If there is no 
proof that does not make assumptions about the components listed in the first 
argument to this predicate, the second argument is defined to be the special 
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expression consistency. The following axioms suffice: 
tp ( Components, ConflictSet ) + 
inconsistency ( Proof), 
7 uses_components( Components, Proof), 
conflict_set ( Proof, ConflictSet ) 
tp( Components, consistency) c- 
7 ( inconsistency ( Proof), 
7 uses_components( Components, Proof) ) 
This axiomatization of tp is correct, but notice that it is inefficient for left-to-right 
theorem provers: it finds a complete Proof before checking to make sure that the 
Proof does not use any of the components named in the list Components. This 
inefficient generate-and-test solution procedure can be transformed with the 
techniques described below to yield a provably correct theory from which diag- 
noses can be established using a minimal number of constrained proofs. 
The “paring-down” procedure Reiter defines to call tp in the computation of 
diagnoses is also easily represented in Horn clauses, and can simply be added to 
the metatheory (though this is not relevant to the present material, and so will be 
left to the reader). Appropriate instances of tp can also be used to efficiently find 
diagnoses that assume less than n faults. The flexibility of our metatheoretical 
approach makes other elaborations of Reiter’s basic approach straightforward. For 
example, in some types of systems, there may be pairs of components which very 
rarely fail together. In such cases, it would be easy to tailor the search to find any 
diagnoses that remain without the assumption that both members of any such pair 
have failed. 
3.2. Planning 
Planning problems can be expressed in terms of an appropriate relation between a 
plan and a goal such that performing the plan will achieve the goal. In some 
formulations of planning problems, the plan itself is closely related to a proof. 
D. H. D. Warren noted this point in discussing WARPLAN, for example: “. . . there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between plans and the proofs that these plans 
achieve the desired goals. . . . Thus the terms representing plans can equally well 
be said to represent proofs of these plans. . . . ” [381. On this approach, actions are 
expressed by rules, so that an action is a way of making certain propositions true. 
In a recent similar project, Bibel has also used this correspondence between 
proofs and plans to provide an explicit formulation of planning as a problem of 
finding a proof satisfying certain constraints [I]. He shows that “connection 
sRather than blocking the use of certain assumptions, Reiter gives a theorem prover sets of clauses 
from which those assumptions are absent. This requires that the system that calls the theorem prover 
have a (metatheoretic) way of naming the clauses used by the theorem prover. We have introduced such 
an extension of our framework in defining the demo predicate, but the simple approach described here 
does not require that extension. 
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proofs” meeting certain constraints correspond to plans. Recasting Bibel’s con- 
straints in a way appropriate for resolution proofs in Horn-clause theories is not 
trivial.6 Bibel adopts the simplifying assumption that every proposition whose truth 
is affected by an action is listed in the antecedent of the action rule. Then his 
constraint is roughly that, in a forward chaining system, the axioms used to 
establish the preconditions of an action should not be assumed to hold later in the 
proof, “after the action”.’ 
A simple example will illustrate the correspondence between plans and proofs 
meeting certain constraints. It will also illustrate some minor difficulties with 
representing planning problems in a Horn-clause resolution system. Consider a 
simple “blocks world” example with blocks u and 6. We can represent an initial 
state as follows: 
clear(b) + 
on(b, u) +- 
on(a,floor) + 
To represent a simple move action, we introduce a predicate that indicates what 
was moved, what it was moved from, and what is was moved to: 
move(Block, OldSupport, NewSupport). Then we can represent the acceptable pre- 
conditions of the action with clauses like the following: 
move( Block, OldSupport, floor) + 
on ( Block, OldSupport), 
1 identical ( OldSupport, floor ) , 
clear ( Block) 
move (Block, OldSupport, Support) +- 
clear ( Support), 
on ( Block, OldSupport), 
7 identical ( Block, Support) ,
clear ( Block) 
We can represent the effects of a move with a sentence like the following: 
move (Block, OldSupport, Support ) -+ on( Block, Support) A clear( OldSupport) 
This can be expressed as two Horn clauses, but then it should be kept in mind that 
6Bibel underestimates the difficulty of representing his approach in Horn-clause, resolution-based 
approaches. He suggests that the “linearity” constraint used for connection proofs could be applied 
directly in Horn-clause resolution proofs [l, p. 1291, but this idea is mistaken, as shown by his own 
Figure 1, in which the resolution proof corresponding to a simple plan is shown to lack “linearity”. 
‘The reason I focus on the planning strategies of Warren and Bibel is that they are so directly 
expressible in our framework. Both use the proof context to indicate the notions of “before” and 
“after” the action. This rather confusing and inelegant feature of their approach is avoided in other 
formulations-see especially Kowalski’s [15]. These more elegant formulations are also naturally 
expressed in metatheoretic terms, as noted by Kowalski [15, p. 1361, and with a little effort can also be 
represented with a formulation similar to that used here. 
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on(a,b) 
I I I 
holds holds move(b.a,floor) 
[si preserved1 [si preserved1 
on@,4 -identical(a,floor) clear(b) 
I 
holds 
[in si] 
I 
holds 
[in si] 
FIGURE 3. A planning-problem proof tree. 
one move action suffices to make both consequents true: 
on ( Block, Support) + move( Block, OldSupport, Support) 
clear ( OldSupport) + move ( Block, OldSupport, Support) 
A minor problem is raised by this Horn reformulation of the clause for move. 
An action typically makes several things true, but in a Horn-clause system we must 
use different clauses to establish each of the different (atomic) conclusions. Yet 
this will remove the one-to-one correspondence between plans and proofs, and it 
also introduces inefficiency in having to find “proofs” of the same action more 
than once. For these reasons, we can add rules for on and clear that say they 
already hold: 
on ( Block, Support) + holds 
clear ( OldSupport) + holds 
And then we put a constraint on the occurrence of holds nodes in the proof to the 
effect that the parent is made true by an action that has already been performed. 
More precisely, holds nodes are allowed only if their parents are preserved by 
earlier actions and true in the initial state sit or if they are established by an earlier 
action and preserved thereafter. (In the tree displayed in Figure 3, we represent 
the former justification of the holds relation with the annotation “in si” when 
there have been no earlier actions and with “si preserved” when the earlier actions 
have preserved the relevant features of the initial state si.) 
Most Horn-clause resolution systems reason backward from the goal (i.e. from a 
negative clause). That means that the needed actions will be found in reverse 
order, and the preconditions for the actions immediately prior to the final state 
may have been established not in the initial state but by previous actions. When we 
speak of an “earlier” or “previous” action we mean one that occurs later in the 
proof. The conditions on holds nodes will be enforced with respect to nodes 
occurring later in the proof. 
Applying 7. to this theory, we can establish correct representations of its 
proofs, and some of the proofs do correspond to valid plans. For example, a proof 
tree for +- on(a, b) is shown in Figure 3, with annotations on the holds nodes to 
indicate their justifications. This proof corresponds to the following plan for 
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achieving o&a, b) from the initial state clear(b), on(b, a), on(a, floor): 
move(b,a,floor);move(a,floor,b). 
In effect, it is proofs of this kind that are found by Warren’s and Bibel’s systems. 
With a correct formulation of the holdsjust@ed(Proof> constraints on the 
occurrences of holds in a given Proof we could formulate our planning problems 
as follows: Given an atomic goal G and the basic theory of the domain S, obtain a 
proof tree Proof that satisfies holds_justified(Proof) by finding a suitable refuta- 
tion of TJG) U T&S). The sequence of actions can then be collected in the reverse 
order of their preorder occurrence in the tree. The plan corresponding to the 
proof tree displayed in Figure 3 can thus be obtained as an instance of pfun(Plan) 
provable in a theory containing the result of applying TV to our basic theory and 
the following clause: 
plan( Plan) +- on( a, b, Proof), 
holds justified ( Proof ) , 
plun_in_proof (Proof, Plun) 
While this representation of the problem is correct, it is not feasible. Once 
again, the solution strategy with a left-to-right theorem prover is, in effect, the 
terribly inefficient “generate-and-test” approach. Entailments of the original, overly 
general theory are generated and then tested against the constraints. Since in 
many problems the constraints rule out most of the generated cases, it would be 
much more efficient to apply the tests as soon as possible, to partial proofs, rather 
than generating complete proofs before testing them. We will consider how to 
formulate a logical representation of the problem that can be more efficiently used, 
after considering some other applications of our technique. 
Another problem with our representation of plans is that the proofs specify a 
total ordering of the steps of the plan, backtracking to find alternative orderings 
when necessary. A metatheoretic approach which uses more efficient partial 
orderings of subplans (as in [7, 221) is under development. 
3.3. Natural-Language Parsing 
A division of labor between levels of representation has been used, if only 
implicitly, in many approaches to parsing. Many parsers can be seen, at some level 
of abstraction, as using rewrite rules together with additional principles which 
“filter” out some of the derivations allowed by the rewrite rules. This “filtering” is 
done partly by the action of “agreement rules” and similar principles whose 
domain is relatively restricted. 8 The more challenging job for the parser is to 
properly enforce conditions that are not naturally stated as requirements on sister 
nodes, conditions that depend on larger portions of the structural representation. 
These conditions have prompted a great variety of special and complex parsing 
*For example, most PROLOG parsers for fragments of natural language fit this description. An 
appendix of [24], for example, presents a DCG recognizer with tests. Without the tests, the DCG 
corresponds to an overly general grammar. The tests, in effect, filter out the unwanted derivations from 
the overly general grammar. 
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mechanisms. Our approach allows a simple and elegant logical representation of 
such conditions to be used directly. 
A simple example suffices to illustrate the metalogical approach to parsing.’ 
Pereira and Warren [24] define an elegant and efficient “definite-clause grammar” 
(DCG) representation of context free grammars. Strings in the extensions of 
nonterminal categories are represented with “difference lists”-pairs of lists LO, L 
that represent the string consisting of the elements of L after the elements of LO 
have been removed from the tail of L. With this representation, there is a simple 
“translation” from CFGs to definite clauses (DCs) that can be efficiently used with 
“left-to-right” Horn-clause proof techniques. The context-free derivation trees for 
the grammar correspond to logical derivation or proof trees in the definite-clause 
representation, and so it is natural to attempt to represent constraints on accept- 
able structural representations as constraints on logical derivations. 
A definite-clause grammar can easily be extended to enforce feature agreement. 
The following definite-clause grammar with features will suffice to illustrate the 
use of Chomskian constraints: 
s(LO,L) -np(F,Znda,LO,Ll),vp(Ll,L) 
np( -wh, Index, LO, L) + name( LO, L) 
np( -wh, Index, LO, L) +det(LO,Ll),n(Ll,L) 
np( -wh, Index, LO, L) + det( LO, Ll), n( Ll, L2), sbar( L2, L) 
np( F, Index, LO, L) + truce( Index, LO, L) 
np( +wh, Index, LO, L) * ref_pro( LO, L) 
truce( Index, L, L) + 
sbar( LO, L) +- comp( LO, Ll), s( Ll, L) 
comp( LO, L) + np( + wh, Index, LO, L) 
vp( LO, L) + verb( LO, Ll), np( F, Index, Ll, L) 
name([mulylL], L) + 
det([thelL], L) + 
4[maWl, L) + 
reZ_pro([whojL], L) + 
verb([fikeslL], L) t 
In this simple grammar, special subclasses of np are singled out by the +wh and 
- wh features. Relative pronouns like “who” are + wh; phrases like “the man” 
and “the man who mary likes” are - wh; and the special category truce, which 
always expands to the empty string, is the only noun phrase that can be either 
+ wh or -wh. Also, notice that every np has an uninstantiated (and hence 
universally quantified) argument, Znda, which will play a special role in enforce- 
ment of the constraints. 
‘This cxampl:: is treated in detail in [33]. 
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np(-wh,A,[mary,likes.maryl,Pikes,maryl) vtillikes,maryl,ll) 
I 
name([mary,likes.maryl.Ilikes,maryl) ve b(@ikes.maql.lmaryl) np(-wh,BJmarylJl) 
I 
name(lmaryl.11) 
FIGURE 4. A proof tree for +- s([maly, likes, mmy], [ 1). 
np VP 
name verb nP FIGURE 5. A parse tree for the sentence “mary likes mary”. 
I 
name 
I 
mary likes maiy 
According to this theory, the set of sentences includes “mary likes the man”, 
“the man who mary likes likes mar-y”, “ the man who likes mary likes mary”, “the 
man who likes the man who likes mary likes mary”, and so on. Notice, though, that 
the set also includes “likes”, “likes mary”, “likes the man likes”, and other strings 
that are not English sentences. We can eliminate the acceptance of these latter 
strings by imposing constraints on derivations. The similarity between grammatical 
derivation trees and proof trees from a definite-clause representation of the 
grammar is clear. lo Consider the p roof tree of Figure 4. This corresponds to a 
parse tree that would usually be displayed in the form shown in Figure 5. In the 
remainder of this section we will display the more readable parse trees as 
abbreviations for the corresponding proof trees, and constraints on these proof 
trees will be used to block the derivation of ungrammatical strings. 
For purposes of illustration, we will use three constraints that are simplified 
versions of constraints actually proposed in government-binding theory.” Our first 
constraint is a simplistic rendering of the “Scriterion”: an np that is immediately 
dominated by camp is in an A-position, and every np must either be in A-position 
or else coindexed with exactly one np that is in A-position [37]. The simpler 
condition we want to impose here can be expressed in the following way: 
1. A theta condition. If camp immediately dominates an np, that np must be 
coindexed with a trace that is not dominated by camp. 
“This correspondence, suggested in [24], is precisely specified in 1341. 
“A formalization of these constraints that is not simplified is presented complete detail in [341. 
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det n 
I I 
A 
ComP s 
nP 
FIGURE 6. A parse tree for the noun phrase 
I i” A 
“the man who mary likes ma@‘. 
d_p name verb np 
I 
name 
I 
the man who mary likes mary 
the man 
camp 
I A 
np 
I 
FIGURE 7. A parse tree for the noun phrase 
“the man who likes may”. 
relsro trace verb np 
I 
name 
I 
who likes mary 
This constraint is intended to block the acceptance of noun phrases like the one 
shown in Figure 6, in which there is no trace that can be coindexed with “who”, 
while allowing structures like the one shown in Figure 7. 
Our second constraint should be subsumed by the “empty-category principle” 
[37] in a more adequate government-binding parser: 
2. A trace-binding condition. A trace must be coindexed with a preceding np that 
is immediately dominated by camp. 
This second constraint is intended to block the acceptance of sentences containing 
a trace that is not coindexed with any relative pronoun, as in Figure 8. 
Our third constraint is essentially a special case of the “complex-NP constraint”, 
which says that no element in an s dominated by an np that has a lexical head 
noun can be moved out of that np [37]. It can be expressed as follows: 
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trace verb nP FIGURE 8. A parse tree for the sentence “likes ma@. 
I 
name 
I 
likes mary 
det n 
xl na n 
sbar 
camp 
I 
np 
1 
name verb nP 
mary li ke s t 
det n sbar 
camp 
I A 
w v VP 
I I A 
RLP”J trace verb 
! I i” _.. 
who trace man 
FIGURE 9. A parse tree for the noun phrase “the man who mary likes the man who likes”. 
3. A complex-NP constraint. An np dominated by sbar cannot be coindexed with 
an np that is not dominated by that sbar. 
This principle, originally due to Ross [28], is subsumed by the “subjacency” 
principle in a more sophisticated parser [9, 371. It blocks the acceptance of noun 
phrases like the one in Figure 9, in which one of the “coindexing” relations must 
cross an sbar boundary. 
The use of indices on categories is standard in current government-binding 
theory [9, 371: the indices play a role in constraints like the ones proposed here, 
and categories with identical indices are usually taken to be “coreferential” in 
some sense. All of the other notions used in this informal statement are standard, 
with the possible exception of “precedes”. What we mean by “precedes” can be 
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expressed as follows: node1 precedes node2 if node1 does not dominate node2 and 
node1 precedes node2 in a standard preorder sequential representation. In other 
words, in any tree, node1 precedes node2 if node1 is to the left of the path from 
node2 to the root. 
These three simple constraints suffice to block the derivations of the non- 
English strings mentioned above. They all have quite natural logical representa- 
tions, representations that can be made to interact appropriately with the grammar 
rules provided above. Consider the first constraint. 
The first constraint, the theta condition, is satisfied by any Tree if for every NP 
in Tree, if NP is dominated by camp then there is a coindexed trace in Tree that is 
not dominated by camp. We can represent this rule (roughly) as follows:12 
VTree( theta( Tree) + 
V( parent( comp( LO, Ll), np( Fl, II, L2, L3), Tree) + 
subtree( truce( 12, L4, L4), Tree), 
7 ancestor( comp( L5, L6), trace( 12, L4, L4), Tree), 
coindexed( Zl, 12) ) ) 
A predication ancestor(Node1, Node2, Tree) is true just in case Node1 is an 
ancestor of Node2 in Tree; in other words: Node1 dominates Node2 in Tree. The 
predicates parent and subtree similarly have the standard interpretations, and are 
easily axiomatized. Notice that the theta condition on trees is not a Horn clause, 
even though we have weakened the biconditional to the needed only-if direction. It 
contains universal quantifiers and negation in its antecedent. However, there are 
well-known techniques for transforming this formula into one that can be used by a 
Horn-clause theorem prover augmented with the negation-as-failure rule. 
Given such formulations of the constraints on derivations, we can formulate a 
logically correct representation of our parsing problem. Notice that the formula- 
tions of these constraints presuppose that they apply to a completed parse tree. So, 
for example, we do not want to apply the truce-binding constraint (which says that 
a trace must be coindexed with a preceding np that is dominated by camp) to a 
subtree containing just a truce or to the subtree containing just the trace and its 
parent np: the constraint must apply to the whole tree. The most straightforward 
way to do this is to apply the transformation TV to the grammar, and then embed 
the transformed grammar in another theory that contains the constraints and a 
predicate which is satisfied only by completed trees that satisfy the constraints 
constrained_s( LO, L, Tree) + s( LO, L, Tree), 
satisjies_constraints( Tree) 
satisfies_constraints( Tree) +- the&( Tree), 
trace_ bound ( Tree) , 
complex_ np ( Tree ) 
“One problem with the following formulation is that we have not provided terms that denote 
uniquely each truce and np in the tree. We can avoid this problem simply by giving each node in the 
tree an additional unique argument, such as an integer or a representation of its “left context”, 
discussed below. In dealing with our sample grammar, though, this problem will not arise. 
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This is another “naive” metatheoretic representation: it is correct but not satisfac- 
tory for practical purposes. 
The inefficiency of this naive representation of the parsing problem is easy to 
see. We do not want to have to go through proving that a string is an np followed 
by a vp and then rule out the derivation because of a violation of the complex-NP 
constraint in the first np. Similarly, we do not want to blindly assign indices to 
every np before evaluating whether the assignment satisfies the constraints. Since 
the constraints rule out lots of derivations which would otherwise be allowed by 
the context-free component, we want to apply those constraints as soon as 
possible. In other words, the application of a standard left-to-right proof strategy 
to the straightforward logical formulations of this problem provides an infeasible 
generate-and-test solution strategy. 
4. MORE EFFICIENT METATHEORIES 
Left-to-right Horn-clause theorem provers have been shown to be capable of 
handling many problems feasibly (though of course they are not feasible in general 
-Horn-clause theories are only semidecidable). For practical reasons, it is of 
interest to attempt to recast our logically correct formulations of metatheoretic 
problems in a more feasible form. As noted above, all of the representations 
presented in the previous section suffer from a common problem: with left-to-right 
theorem provers, they will provide inefficient generate-and-test olution strategies. 
We will briefly consider some of the most straightforward and sound methods of 
reformulating these problems for more efficient execution. 
The problems with generate-and-test solution methods are familiar from the 
study of constraint-satisfaction problems. It is widely recognized that considerable 
savings can result from checking partial solutions against constraints, rather than 
generating complete solutions before checking them. This “backtracking” strategy 
is still not ideal, though. It is known to exhibit a “thrashing” that involves 
repeatedly checking the same unsuccessful partial solutions and wasteful back- 
tracking [18]. Unfortunately, the most efficient methods for constraint-satisfaction 
problems exploit features that our problems do not possess, such as allowing the 
specification in advance of finite, discrete domains from which each element of a 
partial solution must be drawn [36]. Our problems involve applying constraints to 
proofs of arbitrary size, and so both the proofs and relevant subparts of those 
proofs will typically be drawn from infinite discrete domains. Consequently, we will 
here consider only a technique for getting a representation that allows the 
constraints to be applied as soon as possible. Additional efficiency may be.obtained 
by adding search heuristics and intelligent backtracking techniques. 
4.1. The Metainterpretation Approach 
Metainterpretation in left-to-right Horn-clause theorem proving with constraints 
has been used in many PROLOG applications [3, 321. It is easy to modify the 
simple provability predicate demo, presented above, so that a left-to-right theorem 
prover will check at each step to make sure that the proven atoms satisfy 
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axiomatized constraints: 
demo(Theoly,(P,Q)) tdemo(Theory,P),demo(Theory,Q) 
demo ( Theory, P) +member((P+-),Theory), 
satisjies_construints( P) 
demo ( Theory, P ) +--member((P+Q),Theoly), 
demo ( Theory, Q ) , 
satisfies_construints ( P) 
This new strategy requires (1) a different representation of the derivations, one 
which is available and efficient at every point in the proof, and (2) a reformulation 
of the constraints themselves so that they can be applied at arbitrary points in the 
computation. 
4.1.1. Formalizing Derivation Left Contexts. The transformation rO does not 
provide the representations of the derivation that are needed for this strategy. In 
the course of a left-to-right proof, we may need to be able to inspect the parts of 
the proof tree that are already completed. In general, a constraint applied at any 
point in the proof tree should be able to test any part of the proof tree that 
precedes it, i.e., its “left context”. (It would be nice to be able to test the right 
siblings and the right siblings of ancestors as well, but that is not feasible using a 
left-to-right proof strategy, since that part of the tree will not have been formu- 
lated yet, and the constraints will typically allow indefinitely many different 
extensions of any left context.) Another problem with the representation of the 
proof provided by G-~ is that it makes the root node and its daughters most 
accessible. Since we would like to apply the constraints at the earliest possible 
point, we will typically be interested not in the root node, but in the left siblings 
and ancestors of the current node. Fortunately, there are a number of well-known 
tree representations that do not have these problems. A reversed, sequential 
representation of the proof tree will allow the left context to be built up incremen- 
tally, and it will make the current node most accessible. 
We can get a version of a simple “preorder sequential representation” [14] by 
simply flattening our original representations and treating /I and 1 as terms that 
will serve as structural indicators with the obvious meaning in the flattened 
representation. Then p/[ q/[ s], r] would be represented by [ p, /[, q, /[, s, I, r, II. 
This sequential representation is easily reversed, and can be incrementally built 
just by adding current nodes to the front of the list once they are proven. To 
facilitate readability in the reversed form, we will reverse the brackets in our 
structural indicators, representing p/[q/[s], r] as [l, r, 1, s, I\, q, I\, p]. (Any two 
distinct terms in place of [ and ]\ could serve equally well as structural indicators.) 
Since we want to build our trees in the course of doing a proof, we will need a 
slightly more complex program transformation: the left-context representation 
when proving some subgoal should not be the same as the one when proving the 
next subgoal. So we use a pair of arguments to represent the left context before 
the proof and the left context after the proof, respectively. We can define a 
transformation pi that will do this. A proof (in both SLD resolution and Earley 
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deduction) begins with a negative clause, and so such clauses will have the empty 
left context as their initial representation, and a variable to be instantiated with 
the completed proof tree. Consider the following example: 
S={ +p, 
p+q,r, 
4 +-S, 
r+, 
s+ 17 
71(S) = 1 a CPU I? fim, 
p(~refO,[W~dl) ~4([1\,plproof~l,~~~f~~, 
r(Proofl,Proof), 
9( fioof% [W~dl) ~~([l\,qI~r~~fOl,~r~~f), 
r(fioof, [Wf-41) + , 
4~oof, Lw-~~fl) + 1. 
At every point in a left-to-right proof in this theory, we are provided with a 
reversed sequential representation of the left context with the most recently 
completed nodes or structural indicators at the front. Notice that these left-context 
representations do still correspond to trees, but the trees correspond to initial 
segments of derivations rather than to completed derivations. 
Clearly there is a definition of r1 that will provide our required features: 
noninterference and representational correctness. And again, the step complexity 
of proofs is unchanged by the transformation, though unification complexity is 
increased. 
4.1.2. Formalizing Constraints for Early Application. When relations between 
nodes in the proof tree are being tested, as in the parsing application discussed 
above, formalizing the constraints so that they will be applicable at arbitrary points 
in the proof is not trivial. The basic idea we will use is one that has been used in 
other work on parsing with constraints [13]: we can represent the constraints in 
terms of conditions on right and/or left contexts, testing the left context immedi- 
ately, and providing a special mechanism that will pass constraints on right 
contexts to the right. 
Consider, for example, the three constraints of our parsing application. Notice 
that the first two constraints, the theta condition and the trace-binding condition, 
in their original first-order formulation, say that if there is a node of a certain kind, 
then there must be another node of a certain kind. So we can use the following 
strategy: test every node at completion; if it is of the kind mentioned in the 
antecedent of one of these constraints, then check the left context for the other 
required node; if it is not in the left context, then pass the existence condition to 
the right; and ensure that all conditions passed to the right are satisfied before the 
parse is complete. The third parser constraint, on the other hand, sometimes 
introduces a requirement hat must be satisfied by every node in the tree. For this 
type of constraint we can test every node at completion; if it is of the kind 
mentioned in the antecedent of this third constraint, check the left context 
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immediately, and if the left context does not already violate the condition, pass the 
global constraint to the right. This means that we can have two different types of 
constraints passed to the right: existence requirements that can be removed as 
soon as they have been satisfied, and conditions on every node that must be carried 
throughout the parse and applied as soon as possible after every point at which a 
violation may occur. 
Thinking in terms of the left-to-right refutation strategies, this approach re- 
quires that the demo predicate be able to carry constraints to the right. A simple 
approach distinguishes “local constraints” which are applied at every node from 
“global constraints” which may be collected in the course of the proof and “passed 
to the right”. We can distinguish the two different kinds of constraints in the global 
constraint lists by placing them in one of the two forms exists(Constraint) and 
all(Constraint): the former constraints can be removed as soon as they are satisfied; 
the latter must apply everywhere. After satisfying each local constraint, we can try 
to satisfy any of the global existence constraints, and then we can impose the 
requirement that no unsatisfied existence constraints remain at the end of the 
proof. 
When we have defined the constraints as appropriate for a particular applica- 
tion, a demo predicate like the following will apply them in the manner just 
described: 
demo ( Theory, P ) +demo(Theory,P,[],G), 
satisfies_global_construints( G) 
demo(Theory,(P,Q),GO,G) +demo(Theory,P,GO,Gl), 
demo(Theory,Q,Gl,G) 
demo( Theory, P, GO, G) +member((P+),Theory), 
sutisfies_locul_construints( P, GO, G) 
demo( Theory, P, GO, G) +member((P+Q),Theoty), 
demo(Theory,Q,GO,Gl), 
sutkfies_locul_construints( P, Gl, G) 
sutisfies_gfobul_construints( G) + 7 member ( exists ( Constraint ) , G ) 
We have not automated this transformation of the theory-and it is clear that 
unless some restrictions are placed on the constraints to be enforced, the transfor- 
mation is not automatable, since it involves determining what part of an arbitrary 
proof tree is tested. However, the transformation is fairly straightforward in many 
cases, and can be carried out manually. The use of this approach on the parsing 
problem of the previous section is described in detail in [33]. 
4.1.3. Specializing the Leji Contexts. Building and testing complete representa- 
tions of left contexts is an unnecessary computational burden if we can show that 
there are parts of these trees which no constraint will ever test. Ideally, we would 
like a provably adequate but minimal representation of the proof, relative to the 
axiomatization and the constraints that will actually be imposed. Notice that 
testing the trees for satisfaction of the constraints may be much more expensive 
than the construction of the trees, and so it may be worthwhile to keep the 
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minimal representation of the left context for use in these tests even if a complete 
proof representation must also be built for other purposes. In that case, we can use 
a transformation T* which adds three extra arguments to each grammatical 
predicate: the argument hat would be added by T,, and the pair of arguments that 
would be added by ri, except that we now subject the latter pair of arguments to 
specialization. The first argument builds a representation of the completed proof 
tree; the latter pair of arguments holds just enough left context to be able to 
enforce all of the constraints. 
We can reduce the representations of left context in the following ways: 
unneeded nodes can be removed from the tree, and unneeded parts of node labels 
can be removed. We will consider each of these strategies in turn. 
If a node in the proof tree is never tested, and if its removal from the tree will 
not change any of the tested relations between nodes, then the node can be 
removed from the tree. This may remove some leaves. It may also remove 
branching or nonbranching nodes, leaving the daughter(s) of the removed node 
attached to the parent of the removed node, except when the parent is the root, in 
which case we are left with a finite sequence of trees. In the simple diagnosis 
technique described above, only the not_abnormal nodes are needed. In the 
simple parsing example, we need only camp, np, trace, and sbar nodes. 
This last method for finding unneeded nodes in the left-context representation 
suggests yet another restriction which might be made. Our “backtracking strategy” 
may interact with the goal of keeping the minimal necessary tree representations: 
there may be cases in which we need to keep some substructure in the left context 
unless it has already been found to satisfy the relevant constraints. So checking 
relevant substructures at the earliest point not only will improve performance by 
culling lots of false starts, but may also allow smaller representations of the left 
context to be passed to the right. So our principled removal of unneeded informa- 
tion from the reversed, sequential representation of the left context could be based 
not only on an analysis of the theory and applicable constraints, but also on an 
analysis of the points at which the constraints will be applied. 
The second sort of possible reduction in the left-context representation can be 
used when there are parts of the node labels which are not needed for enforce- 
ment of the constraints. In our simple grammar, an example of this is the first 
argument of the np nodes, used to specify grammatical features. These features 
are irrelevant to constraint enforcement, and so they can be eliminated from the 
left-context representation. 
4.1.4. Assessment of the Metainterpretation Approach. The change from a first- 
order formulation of a problem to this metainterpreter formulation of the parsing 
problem is often nontrivial, and consequently it is harder to establish that the 
metainterpreter representation is, in an appropriate sense, equivalent %o the 
first-order formulation. The obstacles are clear: we have changed data structures 
from trees to sequential left-context representations; we have changed the con- 
straint representations for application to left and right contexts; we use negation as 
failure; and we also use “global constraints”. These obstacles are often manage- 
able. 
The metainterpretation approach has real advantages. It preserves complete 
modularity in the axioms and the constraints on proofs. This is valuable for getting 
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the constraints implemented correctly before specializing the left-context represen- 
tations, constraint applications, etc. And this approach is much more efficient than 
the “naive” representation. However, the overhead expense of metainterpretation 
is unnecessary. 
4.2. The Compilation Approach 
The metainterpretation approach is quite elegant, but we can get rid of the 
expense of the metainterpreter with a simple transformation. Sometimes, the 
enforcement of constraints does not require a global constraint list, but even those 
cases that do require it are easily handled. The role of the metainterpreter in the 
most difficult cases is (i) to apply the local constraints after each predication is 
proven, (ii) to carry the global constraint list through the proof, and (iii) to apply 
the global constraints upon completion of the grammatical proof. All of these tasks 
can be carried out without metainterpretation. We describe one very straightfor- 
ward treatment. 
We can easily achieve (i) without metainterpretation. We can simply apply the 
local constraints as a final condition in each axiom. But we can do better than this 
by noting that the local constraints have nontrivial application only when we have 
used a rule that expands a node in a position that could satisfy the antecedent of 
one of the constraints. Only those rules need to be conditioned. 
The remaining roles of the metainterpreter are also easy to cover. We can 
accomplish (ii) by using a pair of lists to carry the global constraints from one 
grammatical predicate to the next, in the way we have used the pairs of lists to 
hold the string to be parsed in our parsing example. And finally, we can accomplish 
(iii) by introducing a predicate that will check the global constraints after the 
grammatical proof is complete. The constraints can then remain exactly as they 
were for the metainterpretation strategy, and the resulting system will run much 
faster.13 
4.2.1. Automating the Transformation to Compiled Form. Since the compiled 
version of the parsing system runs more efficiently that the other representations 
we have considered, it is obviously the version to prefer for most practical 
purposes. The compilation methodology, even for the difficult cases we have 
considered, is not hard to sketch. 
Given a first-order formulation of a problem in terms of a set of axioms and a 
set of ‘constraints on proofs, we can get to a compiled formulation with the 
13Both the “compiled” formulation of our problems and the previous metainterpretation formula- 
tion have the effect of coroutining the construction of the parse tree with the checking of constraints on 
those trees. This basic strategy is quite familiar in logic programming, and so it is worth noting that 
sometimes the “rightward” passage of constraints on proof trees might be implemented with a 
mechanism like Colmerauer’s geler (freeze) [lo] or Naish’s wait [21]. In our approaches, though, it is 
natural to let the condition triggering a test of a constraint be the completion of a goal with a certain 
predicate (whether or not the completion of that goal instantiates any variables). For example, some 
grammatical constraints are naturally applied after a goal with the predicate np has been completed, 
since this corresponds to the parsing of a noun phrase. This goal ordering could be arranged with one 
of the standard freeze predicates, but I do not think that the implementation would be more elegant or 
efficient than the direct, “compiled” strategy used here. 
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following methodology: 
(a) reformulate the constraints, giving them the form of conditions on right and 
left contexts if necessary, optimizing these formulations where possible, 
testing with metainterpretation; 
6) if relations between nodes are being tested, specialize the representations of 
left contexts based on an analysis of the grammar and the constraints 
formulated by (a); 
Cc) 
(4 
using an analysis of the axioms and the constraints formulated by (a), 
determine which constraints should apply at which nodes; 
transform the axiom set as follows: 
(i) add the following to every occurrence of a predicate in the axioms: an 
argument holding the standard parse tree (if a standard proof tree is 
needed as output), a pair of arguments to build the specialized repre- 
sentation of the left context according to (b), and a pair of arguments to 
carry any global constraints which are added by local constraint applica- 
tion; 
(ii) condition the relevant rules according to the results of (c). 
Some progress has been made in automating this “compilation” step, though parts 
of the transformation will be very difficult to automate satisfactorily. 
Step (a) is probably the most difficult. The proper choice of tree representation 
and feasible definitions of the basic relations on trees are not usually going to be 
obtainable from any simple transformation. The other steps are easier. We have 
preliminary implementations of (b), cc), and (d). Our automated transformations 
still miss many obvious optimizations, but nevertheless, we have found even this 
crude transformation useful: the output of the transformation is guaranteed to 
have the basic features of the trees and left contexts built properly, and this output 
can always be subjected to further modification by a competent logic programmer. 
Application of these techniques to the problems formulated in the previous section 
yielded substantially better performance [33]. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED WORK 
The metatheoretic approach allows natural and succinct representations of a wide 
range of familiar problems in artificial intelligence. We have only sampled a few of 
the potential applications here. The representations of those applications not only 
were easy to formulate, but were easily recast in forms that allowed fast evalua- 
tions with available left-to-right Horn-clause theorem provers. In fact, the use of 
metatheoretic approaches has been more or less implicit in a wide range of 
previous investigations. In some work, such as Reiter’s approach to diagnosis 
discussed above, metatheoretic strategies have already been explicit. 
We have provided the most straightforward logical foundations for such strate- 
gies in the Horn-clause subset of first-order logic. Extending the strategy to full 
first-order logic should be straightforward-this research is currently underway. 
The Horn-clause subset was a natural first step, since it has fast theorem provers 
and a very simple and well-developed proof theory. We presented two techniques 
for constructing metatheories that define correct representations of all the proofs 
in the object theory. When we then define predicates in the metatheory that are 
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satisfied by only some of the object-theory proofs, we can deliberately sacrifice the 
completeness of our strategy with respect to object-theory proofs. If the metatheo- 
retie conditions on object-theory proofs are correctly expressed, we nevertheless 
maintain the desired “completeness”: exactly the right subset of object-theory 
proofs will be defined. A Horn-clause proof method can then be used with the 
metatheory to obtain representations of those proofs. 
The logical foundations for Godelian metatheoretic approaches have been 
presented by Bowen and Kowalski [4]. And other self-referential systems have 
been proposed recently, for example, to allow the definition of Kripke-style truth 
predicates [26]. But none of our applications require such elaborate representa- 
tional schemes. As we noted, those schemes are needed for a certain style of 
incompleteness proof, and for any system capable of representing and reasoning 
about a domain that includes itself, but they are not needed for many problems in 
artificial intelligence. We have chosen to develop the more straightforward and 
more efficient representational approach used by McCarthy [19], Moore [20], and 
others. A comparison with the Giidelian representation schemes hows the practi- 
cal advantages of systems that do not provide self-reference. However, it is 
important to note that the idea that some problems have natural representations in 
terms of overly general axioms together with constraints on proofs is neutral with 
respect to the choice between these two types of logical foundations. 
APPENDIX. IMPORTANT PROPERTIES OF r0 
Proposition 1 (Noninterference). There is an n-step SLD refutation of S U {G} using 
input clauses C,, . . . , C, and correct answer substitution E iff for some substitution 
77 for variables that do not occur in G, there is an n-step SLD refutation of 
TJS) u {T,,(G)] using clauses TJC~), . . . , r&C,,) with correct answer substitution 
7. 
PROOF. - : Our inductive hypothesis is that there is an n-step SLD-refutation of 
S U (Gl with correct answer substitution E. 
(1) 
(2) 
Suppose n = 1. Then G = +A, where A is atomic and there is a unit clause 
C + such that A = C. Since T,JA) and T,(C) differ from A and C, 
respectively, only in having additional final arguments, there will be an mgu 
of T,,,(A) and T,(C) iff there is an mgu of these last arguments. By (ii) in the 
definition of T,, the last argument of T,(A) is a variable X that does not 
occur in A (or C). By (iii) in the definition of T,, the last argument of 
T,(C) is C. Since A = C, T,(A) and T,(C) are unifiable with mgu 17 = 
IX/C}. Thus there is a one-step SLD refutation of r,(S) U (T,(G)} using 
T,,,(C) and mgu 7, where q is a substitution for variables that do not occur 
in G. 
Suppose the result holds for refutations of length n - 1 and that G has a 
refutation (G,Gi,..., 0) of length n with input clauses C,, . . . ,C, and 
empty unifiers. Then the head H of C, is identical to the selected atom A 
of G. Again, since T,,,(A) and T,(H) differ from A and H, respectively, 
only in having additional final arguments, there will be an mgu of T,(A) and 
T,(H) iff there is an mgu of these last arguments. By (ii) in the definition of 
7 my the last argument of A is a variable X that does not occur anywhere 
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else. Since C, may be either a unit or mixed definite clause, we have two 
cases to consider. 
(2a) If 7-,(CiI is a unit clause, then by (iii> the last argument of T,,JC~) is 
C,. Hence T,JA) and r,(Ci) are unifiable with mgu 77 = {X/C,). Since 
G, is the resolvent of C, and G, r,JG,)q is the corresponding 
resolvent of r,JCi) and T,(G). Since X is a new variable that occurs 
nowhere else, it will not occur at all in the resolvent, and so r,(Gi)v = 
r,(Gi). By hypothesis, {T,(G~)} U T,(S) has an (n - D-step refutation 
(r,(GiI, . . . , 0 ) using clauses T,(C~), . . . , TJC,). So in this case we 
have our result: there is an n-step SLD refutation of T,(S) U (T,(G)} 
using clauses T,(C~), . . . , T,(C,) and with a correct answer substitution 
17 that is restricted to variables that do not occur in G. 
(2b) If C, is a mixed clause with head H, then by (iv), the last argument of 
T,(H) is H/L for some list L of variables that occur in the body of C, 
but not in G. I-Ience T,(A) and T,(H) are unifiable with mgu n = 
IX/( H/L)). S’ mce G, is the resolvent of C, and G, T,,JG~)~ is the 
corresponding resolvent of T,(C~) and T,(G). Since none of the 
variables in L are instantiated by 7, T,JG~)~ is a variant of T,(G~). 
Given the hypothesis, we have the corresponding result for this variant: 
{T,(G,)T} u T,(S) has an (n - l)-step refutation (T,,JG,)~, . . . , q ) 
using clauses T,(C~), . . . , T,(C,). So we have the result: there is an 
n-step SLD refutation of T,(S) U {T,(G)} using clauses 
T,(Ci), . . . , T,(C,J and with a correct answer substitution 71 that is 
restricted to variables that do not occur in G. 
=: Our inductive hypothesis is that there is an n-step SLD refutation of 
T,(S) U {T,(G)} using clauses T,(C~), . . . , T,(C,) and with a correct answer substi- 
tution 77 for variables that do not occur in G. 
(1) Suppose II = 1. Then T,(G) = +A, where A is atomic and there is a unit 
clause T,(C +-) such that for some mgu 17 for variables that do not occur in 
G, T,(A>q = T,(C)~. Now T,(A) and T,(C) differ from A and C, respec- 
tively, only in having additional final arguments introduced by T, which are 
unified by 71, so A and C are unifiable with mgu E. Thus there is a l-step 
SLD refutation of S U {G) using C and mgu E. 
(2) Suppose the result holds for refutations of length n - 1, and T,(G) has a 
refutation (T,(G), G,, . . . , q ) of length n with input clauses 
r,(Ci), . . . , T,(C,) and unifiers ni,. . . , v,,. Then 71~ is a unifier of the head 
T,(H) of T,,JC~) and the selected atom T,(A) of T,(G). Again, since the 
corresponding T,(A) and T,(H) differ from A and H, respectively, only in 
having additional final arguments introduced by T,,, which are unified by IJ, 
E will be unifier of A and H. So we have our result: there is an n-step SLD 
refutation of S u {Gl using clauses C,, . . . , C, and correct answer substitu- 
tion E. 0 
Corollary 1 (Nonintetierence). S F VC iff, for some substitution q for variables that 
do not occur in C, T&Q k VTJC)~J. 
PROOF. Since SLD resolution is sound and complete, this result follows immedi- 
ately from Proposition 1. 0 
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Proposition 2 (Representation correctness). Let G = +-A, where A is atomic. There is 
an n-step SLD refutation of r”(S) u {7,&G)) with a computed answer substitution 77 
iff 77 is a substitution {Proof/Tree) such that Proof is the variable introduced into 
rO(G) by TV, and Tree is a derivation tree corresponding to an SLD refutation of 
{G) u S. 
PROOF. This result is easily established with an induction very similar to the one 
used in the proof of Proposition 1. 0 
Corollary 2 (Representation correctness). Let G = + A, where A is atomic, and let 
rO(G) = +-A’. Then r,,(S) C= VA’77 iff 7, when restricted to variables in A’, is a 
substitution {Proof/Tree} such that Proof is the variable introduced into A’ by rO, 
and Tree is a derivation ?ree corresponding to a refutation of {G} U S. 
PROOF. This immediately follows from Proposition 2 and the soundness and 
completeness of SLD resolution. q 
I am indebted to William Demopoulos and E. W. Elcock for suggestions that substantially improved 
Section 2. The paper was also improved by discussions with Kwok Hung Chan, Richard O’Keefe, and 
Fernando Pereira. This work was supported by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. 
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